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SECOM-D-306

14 January 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

VADM E. A. Burkhalter Jr., USN

Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT:

Impact of NSDD-145 on DCI Authorities

- 1. Action Requested: That you sign a letter to Secretary of Defense Weinberger on the new national structure on telecommunications and automated information systems security established by NSDD-145, noting your intent to the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
- 2. Background and Discussion: NSDD-145 was promulgated after lengthy discussion. Within Defense, Generals Stilwell and Faurer were not in full agreement on the nature and extent of authority that NSA should have under the NSA's view prevailed and the DIRNSA was designated the "National Manager for Telecommunications Security and Automated Information Systems Security." Department of Justice concerns about the authority issue were systems Security Steering Group which will oversee and provide policy guidance on implementation of the NSDD. The directive gives NSA a much broader role vacuum. Much of the impetus for the directive appears to have been a well-improve communications and computer security, particularly for civil agencies
- 3. There is a potential, however, for DCI responsibilities under the National Security Act and authorities under Executive Order to be eroded if you do not firmly assert your intent to retain and exercise them. A "power vacuum" will encourage their erosion. For example, the NSDD disclaims interference with the DCI's "responsibility to act as Executive Agent of the

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Government for technical security (sic) countermeasures." This is an explicit national level definition of your technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) role. Nevertheless, there is a body of opinion that TSCM is so closely allied to COMSEC, TEMPEST and computer security as to be considered a single discipline with them. Unless you exercise this role, the perception could arise that TSCM is ripe to be combined with COMSEC. The Security Committee is drafting for your consideration a proposed DCID on TSCM which will serve, inter alia, to show the flag in this area.

- 4. The proposed letter to the SecDef states your expectation that the NSDD-145 system will produce technical information and equipment useful for the protection of intelligence, and your intent to apply those expected results to update Director of Central Intelligence Directives, such as the ones on computer security for intelligence and on security controls applicable to disseminated intelligence. The third paragraph of the proposed letter alludes to the security review of the critical systems initiated by the IC Staff in 1983, and states your intent to act soon on the results and to ensure proper alignment of effort and resources of your committees responsible for security matters. A revitalization of SECOM's Computer Security Subcommittee, with tasking for an early reissuance of an updated DCID 1/16 and a specific role in system security monitoring, would reflect serious intent in this area. Finally, the proposed letter states the need to clarify your representation on the senior working body for NSDD-145 implementation - the National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NTISSC) - so that your Community role through the IC Staff will be represented as well as your administrative one for the Central Intelligence Agency.
- 5. Recommendation: That you sign the attached proposed letter to the SecDef.

E. A. Burkhalter, Jr.
Vice Admiral, USN

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Attachment: Proposed letter to SecDef

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CONCUR:

/S/ John N. McMahen

18 JAN 1985

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

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